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1. INTRODUCTION
The battle for health-care reform was hardly over when President
Barack Obama signed into law Congress's sweeping reform legislation,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).' Minutes after
the President's signing on March 23, 2010, the legal battle over the law
indeed just began when a coalition of thirteen States, with then-Florida
Attorney General Bill McCollum at the lead, filed suit in federal court in
northern Florida to challenge the Act's constitutionality.2 That same day,
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of
Miami School of Law; B.S., 2007, Virginia Commonwealth University. I thank Law Librarian
Robin Schard for overseeing my initial research for this note in her Legal Research Techniques
course; Professors Kenneth M. Casebeer and Mary I. Coombs for their substantive comments; and
the University of Miami Law Review for continual support.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029.
2. See Complaint, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-91), 2010 WL 1038209.
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Virginia Attorney General Kenneth Cuccinelli sued separately in that
state, with Virginia the sole plaintiff, on similar grounds as the States in
Florida;3 and elsewhere private citizens and organizations initiated yet
other suits condemning the PPACA as an unconstitutional grab of power
by the federal government.' Meanwhile, legal momentum against the
Act has continued to build as similar lawsuits have emerged across the
country, and district courts have rendered conflicting opinions on the
procedural and substantive dimensions of the challenges.s
Although the forum for debate is now the courts, the political over-
tones of these challenges are "self-evident." 6 This is particularly so in
the Florida case, where all but one of the twenty-six state governors and
attorneys general who are now plaintiffs are Republican. "The lawsuit
could have been filed anywhere,"' but media reports speculated that
McCollum and the other state officials opted for Florida to ensure that
appellate review rested with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, a "generally conservative bench,"' which has garnered Supreme
Court review in recent years for invalidating federal law.9 As a means to
3. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH), 2010 WL 1038397. See
generally Matthew R. Farley, Challenging Supremacy: Virginia's Response to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 37 (2010).
4. See Complaint, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(No. 2:10-cv-11156-GCS-RSW), 2010 WL 4784409; Complaint for Declaratory, Preliminary &
Permanent Injunctive Relief, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov.
30, 2010) (No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm).
5. See Amy Goldstein, Status of Legal Challenges to Obama Health Care Overhaul, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/health-care-overhaul-
lawsuits/ (summarizing twenty-four lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the PPACA).
6. Timothy S. Jost, Pro and Con: State Lawsuits Won't Succeed in Overturning the
Individual Mandate, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1225, 1227 (2010), available at http://
content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/6/1225.full.pdf+html. Although Republican legislators have
been eager since the commencement of the 112th Congress to repeal the PPACA, their efforts are
likely to be fruitless as long as Democrats maintain a majority in the Senate and the presidency.
See, e.g., Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, S. 192, 112th Cong. (2011); Repealing
the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act, H.R. 2, 112th Cong. (2011). Thus, the fate of the Act-at
least in the short term-seems to lie in the judiciary.
7. Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a Challenge to Health Care Law, N.Y. TDMEs, May 10,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/health/policy/1 I lawsuit.html?pagewanted= 1&
emc=eta; see also, e.g., Tom McLaughlin, Why Challenge Health Care Reform in Pensacola?,
NORTHWEST FLA. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.nwfdailynews.comlnews/pensacola-
27292-mccollum-health.html.
8. Sack, supra note 7.
9. See United States v. Matthews, 143 F. App'x 298 (11th Cir.) (mem.) (affirming dismissal
of criminal charges under the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 as an unconstitutional
exercise of the Commerce Clause), vacated, 546 U.S. 1073 (2005) (mem.) (vacating and
remanding in light of Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)); United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d
1303 (11th Cir.) (holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 exceeded the
Commerce Clause in an as-applied challenge), vacated, 545 U.S. 1125 (2005) (mem.) (vacating
and remanding in light of Raich); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004)
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this alleged end, McCollum chose not to file suit in Tallahassee, the
location of the Florida attorney general's office. Instead, he filed it 200
miles away in Pensacola, "bypassing a Tallahassee judge who was
named by President Bill Clinton and ensuring that the judge would be a
Republican appointee."o
Since then, the courts have become fully enmeshed in determining
the legal validity of the PPACA. The legislation aims broadly to curb
practices of the health-insurance industry that restrict access to health-
care services and that shift costs to consumers, and aims also to extend
public and private health-insurance coverage to millions of Americans.
The Act's most controversial provision-the challenge to which strikes
"[a]t the heart of the Florida lawsuit"'"-will require most U.S. citizens,
beginning in 2014, to maintain "minimum essential coverage" under a
health-insurance plan or else incur a monetary "penalty."' 2 In defending
this provision in court, the federal government has relied principally on
the Commerce Clause 3 and the General Welfare Clause1 4 in Article I of
the Constitution. As of this writing, three district courts upheld the pro-
vision under the Commerce Clause, while two district courts-including
the Florida district court-rejected it under both clauses."
Undoubtedly, the Florida district court's decision-or any district-
level decision-"will certainly not be the final word"l6 on the PPACA's
(holding that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 exceeded the Commerce Clause in an
as-applied challenge), vacated, 546 U.S. 801 (2005) (mem.) (vacating and remanding in light of
Raich); cf Sanford L. Bohrer & Matthew S. Bohrer, Congressional Power to Criminalize "Local"
Conduct: No Limit in Sight, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221 (2010) (reviewing recent Eleventh Circuit
decisions that upheld, against Commerce Clause attack, federal statutes governing the knowing
possession of a firearm, the local possession of stolen property, and sex-offender registration).
10. Sack, supra note 7.
11. Jost, supra note 6, at 1227.
12. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 1501, 124 Stat.
192, 242-50 (2010).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
15. Compare Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011)
(upholding the provision under the Commerce Clause), appeal filed sub nom. Seven-Sky v.
Holder, No. 10-5047 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2011), and Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-
00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va.) (same), appeal filed, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. Dec. 3,
2010), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich.) (same), appeal
filed, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2010), with Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (invalidating
the provision as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause after having previously held on motion
to dismiss that the General Welfare Clause was inapplicable), appeal filed, No. 11-11021 (11th
Cir. Mar. 9, 2011), and Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va.
2010) (invalidating the provision as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause and holding that
the General Welfare Clause was inapplicable), appeal filed, Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058 (4th Cir.
Jan. 20, 2011).
16. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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constitutional legitimacy. As one district court explained, "the contro-
versy ignited by the passage of the legislation . .. will eventually require
a decision by the Supreme Court after the . . . litigation works its way
through the various circuit courts."" Commentators have opined that the
Eleventh Circuit is uniquely poised to adjudicate the case that might
very well attract Supreme Court review: Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services." Perhaps most significantly
among its features lacking in the other cases, Bondi includes more than
half the States in the United States as plaintiffs (along with two private
citizens and a trade association), giving it "an institutional heft or pres-
tige . . . ."1 Moreover, in addition to the dispute over the minimum-
coverage provision, Bondi also presents a contention that the PPACA's
amendments to Medicaid unconstitutionally "coerce and commandeer"
the States to serve the federal government. With two issues for review,
the Supreme Court could rule on one ground for the plaintiffs and take
"some degree of political cover" by ruling for the federal government on
the other.20
But the course of the litigation is not foreordained. This casenote
cautions the Eleventh Circuit to take into account the role that Bondi
might play in shaping the future of the PPACA and to critically review
the fundamental procedural issues in the case before reaching the sub-
stantive constitutional ones. With respect to the minimum-coverage pro-
vision in particular, this note questions the Bondi court's Article III
standing analysis with regard to the two citizen plaintiffs in the case-
whom the court initially recognized as having standing to challenge the
provision-and proposes a more appropriate analytical framework in
light of other PPACA case law. This note further scrutinizes the Bondi
court's conclusion that the State plaintiffs also have standing to chal-
17. U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10 CV 1065, 2010 WL 4947043, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 22, 2010); cf Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, No. 10-1014 (U.S. Feb. 8, 2011), 2011 WL 465746.
18. No. 3:10-cv-91-RVIEMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). Note that the
stylization of the case changed from the dismissal stage (Florida ex rel. McCollum) to the
summary-judgment stage (Florida ex rel. Bondi) to reflect Florida's new Attorney General, Pam
Bondi, taking over the case. This note thus refers to the case as "Florida ex rel. Bondi" or "Bondi"
when generally describing the case. For an overview of Bondi's views on the issues in the Florida
lawsuit and the role that it played in her election, see Pam Bondi, Op-Ed, The States Versus
ObamaCare, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703384
504576055652391100520.html.
19. Brad Joondeph, And the Focus Shifts to Pensacola. . ., ACA LrTIG. BLOG (Dec. 15, 2010,
4:50 PM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/and-focus-shifts-to-pensacola.html.
20. Id. General agreement has formed in the coverage of Bondi that the plaintiffs' contention
regarding the minimum-coverage provision is stronger and more likely to produce a favorable
outcome than their Medicaid argument. See, e.g., Medicaid Argument Seen as Weak Compared to
Minimum Coverage Challenge, 19 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1781 (Dec. 23, 2010).
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lenge the provision and posits that no current principle of standing sup-
ports this conclusion.
Concern that Bondi-a case that is "laden with public policy impli-
cations and [that] has a distinctive political undercurrent" 21-is an
improper vehicle to resolve the novel constitutional questions regarding
the minimum-coverage provision is the motivating force behind this
note's narrow procedural lens. Simply put, the so-called "individual
mandate" to purchase health insurance should constitutionally live or die
within the confines of a genuine "individual" legal challenge. Although
Bondi does include individual citizen plaintiffs, their role in the suit is
perfunctory; the States are the partisan drivers. None of this, of course,
is to say that the minimum-coverage provision is unconstitutional (inso-
far as an individual has standing to challenge it), which commentators
already have vigorously debated.22
This note is organized as follows: Part II contextualizes the issue of
standing in Bondi with a cursory sketch of the PPACA's minimum-cov-
erage provision and the substantive constitutional conflict that it has
engendered. Part III discusses the Bondi opinions on motion to dismiss
and on motions for summary judgment. Part IV contrasts Bondi's citi-
zen-plaintiff standing analysis with the standing jurisprudence that has
burgeoned from other PPACA case law, focusing on the courts' distinc-
tion between present injury-in-fact and future injury-in-fact. Part IV fur-
ther submits that the State plaintiffs lack standing to contest the
minimum-coverage provision. This part recognizes, however, that prin-
ciples of state standing vis-as-vis the federal government are perhaps
debatable in light of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency2 3 holding that a state "is entitled to special
solicitude in [its] standing analysis."24 Part V concludes.
II. THE MINIMUM-COVERAGE PROVISION: THE FOCAL PoINT
OF CONTROVERSY
A. The Statutory Scheme
"At nearly 2,700 pages, the [Patient Protection and Affordable
Care] Act is very lengthy and includes many provisions .... ."25 Despite
this breadth, judicial review, scholarship, and media coverage have
21. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
22. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey & Jack M. Balkin, Debate, A Healthy
Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 93
(2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf.
23. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
24. Id. at 520 (footnote omitted).
25. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1128 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
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focused largely on the "minimum essential coverage" provision, known
popularly as the "individual mandate."2 6 Congress enacted this measure
on the premise of findings about the state of the national health-care
market and the role that the minimum-coverage provision would play in
relation to the PPACA's various reforms. Specifically, Congress found
that the continual growth of spending on health insurance and health-
care services-comprising 17.6 percent of the national economy in
2009-created an environment susceptible to congressional regulation
of the health-insurance market.2 7 Congressional regulation was war-
ranted, moreover, in part because Congress found that medical expenses
cause half of all personal bankruptcies,2 8 and insurance companies'
administrative costs for plans in the current individual and small-group
markets had grown to consume twenty-six to thirty percent of
29premiums.
In Congress's view, the minimum-coverage provision was integral
to its larger policy goals of greater access to the health-insurance mar-
ketplace and lower prices of insurance plans within that marketplace.
Congress reasoned that by working in concert with other provisions that
liberalize Medicaid eligibility and subsidize the purchase of private
insurance through regulated health-insurance exchanges, the provision
would substantially increase the number of insured.3 0 Indeed, the provi-
sion would achieve "near-universal coverage. "31
Furthermore, Congress considered the minimum-coverage provi-
sion "essential" to effectuating other reforms that would promote access
and lower prices.3 2 In particular, the provision would empower other
parts of the PPACA that prohibit insurers from denying or increasing the
price of coverage based on an individual's preexisting health conditions;
rescinding or declining to renew coverage because of an individual's
health status; and imposing annual or lifetime caps on the coverage
26. See generally The Constitutionality of National Health Refonn, COLUM. L. SCH., http://
www.law.columbia.edu/center-program/ag/policy/health/resources/reformarticles (last visited Jan.
9, 2011) (collecting news sources, policy papers, blog entries, and other resources on the
constitutionality of the PPACA). This casenote generally refrains from using "individual
mandate." Politically charged, this term suggests that everyone must obtain health insurance under
the PPACA. When one accounts, however, for the groups of persons to whom the provision does
not apply, one realizes that "individual mandate" is overbroad. See Jack M. Balkin, The
Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance, N. ENG. J. MED., Jan. 13, 2010,
http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=2764&query=home (describing "individual mandate"
as "misleading").
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) (West 2010).
28. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(G).
29. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(J).
30. See, e.g., id. § 18051 (expanding eligibility for public health-insurance coverage).
31. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(D).
32. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
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available to a policyholder.3 3 Without the minimum-coverage provision,
but with the other regulations in place, Congress concluded that "many
individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed
care."3 4 This phenomenon is called adverse selection.35 No longer armed
with the traditional defenses to protect its bottom line, the insurance
industry would raise premiums across the board to pass on the costs of
treating those who suddenly would need health care. The resulting mar-
ket pressures from having to serve needy policyholders while losing less
needy ones who could not afford or would not want to pay higher premi-
ums could "drive the health insurance industry into extinction." 36
Mechanically, the minimum-coverage provision will operate by
imposing a monthly obligation on an "applicable individual" to maintain
"minimum essential coverage" for that individual and any dependents
beginning in 2014." "Minimum essential coverage" encompasses vari-
ous public and private health-insurance schemes, including Medicaid
and employer-sponsored plans that satisfy stipulated eligibility require-
ments." Those who are subject to the provision and fail to obtain ade-
quate health insurance will face a monetary "penalty," which the
Internal Revenue Service will include with a taxpayer's return. 39 Miti-
gating the harshness of this penalty, the statute enumerates various
exemptions, which preclude imposition of the penalty on, among others,
individuals who cannot afford coverage and those who have suffered a
"hardship" in their capability to acquire sufficient coverage.4 0 The stat-
ute also disallows criminally punishing a taxpayer, filing of notice of
lien with respect to a taxpayer's property, and levying on any such prop-
erty for not timely paying the penalty.4 1
B. The Constitutional Debate
The constitutional debate surrounding the minimum-coverage pro-
vision has been broad in scope. On one side are arguments over whether
33. See, e.g., id. § 300gg-l 1 (prohibiting lifetime or annual limits on health-insurance
coverage).
34. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
35. See id.
36. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1129 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
37. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a) (West 2010). The provision does not regard certain individuals,
such as individuals with valid religious objections to not being subject to its obligations and
individuals unlawfully present in the United States, as "applicable individualls]." Id.
§ 5000A(d)(l)-(4).
38. Id. § 5000A(f)(l)-(3).
39. Id. § 5000A(b)(l)-(2).
40. Id. § 5000A(e).
41. Id. § 5000A(g)(2).
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the Constitution limits this exercise of congressional power. Affirmative
allegations have ranged from the contention that the provision forces one
to associate with "those who 'support or engage in abortion' and with
insurers who fund abortions" in violation of one's First Amendment
freedom;4 2 to the argument that the provision confers the federal govern-
ment with "absolute sovereignty" and "censorial power" over the citi-
zenry, thereby infringing the constitutional guarantee of a republican
government.4 3 On the other side of the debate are arguments over
whether the Constitution empowers Congress with the right to enact the
minimum-coverage provision. To the extent that this is a negativ-
ist-positivist distinction, the courts have engaged primarily in positivist
inquiry, focusing mainly on whether the minimum-coverage provision is
defensible as a regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause or a tax-raising mechanism under the General Welfare Clause.
The decisions so far have been split. The courts that upheld the
provision did so under the Commerce Clause, relying on two bases.
First, they accepted that "the economic decisions that the Act regulates
as to how to pay for health care services have direct and substantial
impact on the interstate health care market."" Notably, these courts
rejected the argument that the decision not to purchase health insurance
is "inactivity" and thus is beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause.
Because every individual will need medical care at some point in his or
her life, they reasoned, this decision amounts to an affirmative choice to
cover one's medical costs through a compensation scheme other than
health insurance (for example, charitable hospital care).4 5 Moreover,
"the total incidence of these economic decisions has a substantial impact
on the national market for health care by collectively shifting billions of
dollars on to other market participants and driving up the prices of insur-
ance policies."4 6 Second, these courts agreed that "the minimum cover-
age provision is essential to the Act's larger regulation of the interstate
business of health insurance."4 7 Looking to Congress's statutory find-
ings, these courts pointed out the harms of adverse selection that would
42. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at *26
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) (citation omitted).
43. Id. at *29 (internal quotation marks omitted); see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
44. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Mead v.
Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *15-16 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Liberty Univ.,
2010 WL 4860299, at *14-15.
45. Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *18-19; Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *15; Thomas
More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
46. Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *15; Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *15-16; Thomas
More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893-94.
47. Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893; Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at * 16-17; Liberty Univ.,
2010 WL 4860299, at *16.
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occur absent the provision-"precisely the harms that Congress sought
to address with the Act's regulatory measures." 48 Additionally, these
courts held that the "penalty" under the minimum-coverage provision
was a legitimate enforcement mechanism for Congress to employ in
requiring applicable individuals to purchase minimum health-insurance
coverage. Having found the provision to be within the scope of the
Commerce Clause, two of these courts did not address the constitution-
ality of the penalty for noncompliance as a tax under the General Wel-
fare Clause.49 The third court did address this question, however, and
concluded for the same reasons as the courts below that the General
Welfare Clause was inapplicable to resolving the penalty's
constitutionality."o
In the second line of decision, the issue was the same, but the ana-
lytical framework, and therefore the result, was different. The courts
here emphasized that even under the Supreme Court's most expansive
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court required "some form of
action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal
entity."" A constitutional application of the Commerce Clause power,
in other words, must involve "activity."5 2 Disagreeing with the decisions
above, these courts rejected the notion that because every individual
inevitably will require medical treatment, "the conduct of the unin-
sured-their economic decision as to how to finance their health care
needs, their actual use of the health care system, their migration in and
out of coverage, and their shifting of costs on to the rest of the system
when they cannot pay- . . . is economic activity."53 According to these
courts, this interpretation of activity was "expansive" and defied "logical
limitation."5 4 Having determined that "an individual's personal decision
to purchase-or decline to purchase-health insurance is beyond the
historical reach of the Commerce Clause," these courts also held that the
Necessary and Proper Clause," which acts as supplementary power to
Congress's enumerated powers, did "not provide a safe sanctuary" for
48. Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *16; Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *17; Thomas More,
720 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95.
49. See Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *11; Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
50. See Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *22-23.
51. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida
ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL
285683, at *21-23 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
52. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *21-23; Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
53. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *23-29.
54. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781; Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *24-29.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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the minimum-coverage provision. 6
These courts' Commerce Clause analysis blended with their Gen-
eral Welfare Clause analysis. In assessing whether the "penalty" under
the minimum-coverage provision was actually a "tax" that Congress
could levy to spend on the general welfare, the courts dissected the leg-
islative history and made similar observations: Congress (1) "specifi-
cally changed the term in previous incarnations of the statute from 'tax'
to 'penalty'"; (2) "used the term 'tax' in describing the several other
exactions provided for in the Act"; (3) "specifically relied on and identi-
fied its Commerce Clause power and not its taxing power"; (4) "elimi-
nated traditional IRS enforcement methods for the failure to pay the
'tax' "; and (5) "failed to identify in the legislation any revenue that
would be raised from it, notwithstanding that at least seven other reve-
nue-generating provisions were specifically so identified."" These fac-
tors led the courts to determine that the penalty was not a "bona fide
revenue raising measure enacted under the taxing power of Congress,"
and thus only some other Article I power could sustain it.5" The text of
the provision was "clear[, however] . . . that the underlying regulatory
scheme was conceived as an exercise of Commerce Clause powers"59
an exercise that these courts held was invalid. Having thereby resolved
that Congress had overstepped its constitutional bounds, these courts
declared that the minimum-coverage provision was unconstitutional.60
III. THE STAKES IN FLORIDA EX REL. BoNDI
A. The Dismissal Opinion
Cognizant of the high-profile nature of the case before him,6 1
Senior District Judge Roger Vinson of the Pensacola Division of the
Northern District of Florida commenced his first major opinion in Bondi
with an explanation of "what this case is, and is not, about."6 2 Noting the
"controversial and polarizing" nature of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the judge stated that it was not his "task or duty to
56. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782; Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *29-33.
57. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1140 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786-87; see also Mead v. Holder, No. 10-
950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *22-23 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 223010, at *9-12 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011).
58. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 787-88; McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1143-44.
59. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788; McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
60. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788; Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *33.
61. See Keith Laing, Health Care Judge Vinson No Stranger to Big Cases, SUNSHINE ST.
NEws (Sept. 14, 2010, 4:05 AM), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/health-care-judge-
vinson-no-stranger-big-cases.
62. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
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wade into the thicket of conflicting opinion" on the wisdom of the law.63
His responsibility was to determine the Act's constitutionality. And at
the motion-to-dismiss stage, his job was merely to decide whether the
court had jurisdiction over some of the claims before it and whether each
count in the amended complaint stated a plausible claim for relief.'
The defendants-the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Labor, and their
respective secretaries-sought to dismiss several claims regarding the
minimum-coverage provision on the ground that under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 65 the court was without jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate them. More precisely, the defendants argued, the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the provision, and their allegations were unripe.
Alternatively, if the court construed the "penalty" under the individual
minimum-coverage provision as a "tax," the Anti-Injunction Act, which
bars "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax,"66 compelled dismissal.67 Further, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 68
the defendants sought to dismiss all six counts of the plaintiffs' amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.6 9
As the court explained in its Rule 12(b)(1) discussion, standing is a
threshold barrier under Article III, which limits the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to "cases" and "controversies."o70 The "irreducible constitu-
tional minimum" of this strand of justiciability are "(1) an injury in fact,
meaning an injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or
imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the causal con-
duct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision."7 1 Injury-in-fact was the sole disputed element.
The court evaluated only whether two citizen plaintiffs (and, by
extension, the plaintiff trade association, the National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB)) had standing to challenge the minimum-
coverage provision. Added by the States to the amended complaint, both
citizens were uninsured individuals who were ineligible for Medicaid or
Medicare. One of them, a small business owner, was a member of the
NFIB, which the States also adjoined to the amended complaint. As a
businesswoman, this plaintiff claimed that the minimum-coverage provi-
63. Id. at 1127-28.
64. Id. at 1128.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
66. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
67. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
69. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
70. Id. at 1144.
71. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City
of Clearwater, Fla., 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (1Ith Cir. 2003)).
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sion would force her and other NFIB members, against their wants, "to
divert resources from their business endeavors" and "reorder their eco-
nomic circumstances" to obtain qualifying coverage.72 By contrast, the
other citizen claimed that the provision compelled him to purchase
health insurance that he did not need as a financially self-sufficient indi-
vidual. In standing parlance, the citizens complained of injury insofar as
the "individual mandate will force them to spend their money to buy
something they do not want or need (or be penalized).""
The court disposed of several of the federal government's objec-
tions that the citizens did not have standing. First, the court rejected the
argument that the citizens' injury was temporally too far off, countering
that imposition of the minimum-coverage provision and penalty was
"definitively fixed in time and impending" and that absent court action,
the federal government would begin enforcing it in 2014.74 Next, the
court suggested that the government's assertion that too much uncer-
tainty surrounded the plaintiffs' allegations was an attempt to "conjure
up hypothetical events . . . ."" On this point, the court clarified that the
citizens' injury was not strictly the "economic burden" of having to
acquire health insurance before 2014: The citizens did "not want to be
forced to spend their money (whether they have a little or a lot) on
something they do not want (or feel that they need), and, in this respect,
they object to the individual mandate as 'unconstitutional overreach-
ing.' "76 In sum, the court was satisfied that the citizens "establish[ed] a
realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's
operation or enforcement that is reasonably pegged to a sufficiently
fixed period of time and which is not merely hypothetical or conjec-
tural." 7 Therefore, they had standing to challenge the minimum-cover-
age provision.
The court rejected the defendants' other jurisdictional arguments as
well. For essentially the same reasons that it held that the citizens had
standing to attack the minimum-coverage provision binding on individu-
als, the court held that the State plaintiffs had standing to attack, as a
violation of their sovereignty, a complementary provision in the PPACA
that requires them and other large employers to insure their employees at
72. Id. at 1145 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1146.
75. Id. at 1147.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Because the citizens had standing, the court held that the association, one of whose
members was the businesswoman plaintiff, also had standing. Id. at 1148.
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a prescribed minimum level." On the question of whether the challenges
to the minimum-coverage provisions applicable to individuals and
employers were ripe, the court emphasized the certain, impending nature
of their imposition and enforcement-factors that worked against the
court postponing adjudication. 0 Well before 2014, moreover, individu-
als, businesses, and states would have to take steps to meet their statu-
tory obligations." Finally, the court spent great length explaining that
the exaction under the minimum-coverage provision was not a "tax."
The Anti-Injunction Act thus did not strip the court of jurisdiction.8 2
Turning to the federal government's arguments that the plaintiffs
failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted under Rule
12(b)(6), the court remarked that it would have to examine each claim
and "take a peek" at the relevant constitutional law." In taking such a
"peek," the court dismissed four of the plaintiffs' six claims. First, the
court rejected the argument that the minimum-coverage provision appli-
cable to the States disturbed their sovereignty as employers and in per-
formance of their governmental functions. The court reasoned that the
provision was a law of general applicability on public and private
employers alike and that its allegedly adverse impact on the States' trea-
suries was not an imposition on state sovereignty and state functions.84
Second, the court found that the PPACA would not breach the States'
79. Id. at 1147-48 ("[T]o wit, the state plaintiffs have established a realistic (and not
hypothetical or conjectural) danger of sustaining a redressable injury at a sufficiently fixed point
in time as a result of the Act's operation or enforcement.").
80. Id. at 1149. The court noted the "conspicuous overlap" between standing and ripeness. Id.
at 1148-49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1205
(11th Cir. 2006)). This overlap is evident in the court's opinion. Compare id. at 1145 (citation
omitted) (stating in its standing analysis that "[i]mposition of the individual mandate and penalty
... is definitively fixed in time and impending" and that "absent action by this court, starting in
2014, the federal government will begin enforcing it"), with id. at 1149 (stating in its ripeness
analysis that "[t]he complained of injury in this case is 'certainly impending' as there is no reason
whatsoever to doubt that the federal government will.enforce the individual mandate and
employer mandate against the plaintiffs").
81. Id. at 1149-50.
82. Id. at 1130-44. The court's analysis here was a mix of substance and procedure. In the
court's words,
whether the individual mandate penalty is a tax is an important question that not
only implicates jurisdiction (vis-A-vis the Anti-Injunction Act), and is not only the
specific basis of one of the plaintiffs causes of action, but it also goes to the merits
of the individual mandate-related challenges . . . (that is, whether the penalty can be
justified by, and enforced through, Congress's indisputably broad taxing power), or
whether, instead, the penalty must pass Constitutional muster, if at all, under the
more limited Commerce Clause authority.
Id. at 1131.
83. Id. at 1151 (internal citations omitted).
84. Id. at 1151-54. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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sovereign police powers by "coercing and commandeering" them to set
up exchanges in which consumers may compare and shop for health-
insurance plans.85 Quite oppositely, the court held, the States had a vol-
untary choice under the statute whether to construct and regulate the
exchanges or to allow the federal government to do so. 86
Of the plaintiffs' three claims challenging the minimum-coverage
provision applicable to individuals, the court dismissed two of them.
Having already resolved that the penalty for noncompliance was not a
tax, the court held that the claim that it was an unconstitutional capita-
tion or direct tax was moot.87 The court also held that the provision did
not implicate any constitutional rights that the Supreme Court regards as
fundamental under the substantive due-process component of the Fifth
Amendment. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court ruled
that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the minimum-cover-
age provision was "essential" to the PPACA's insurance market
reforms."
In refusing to dismiss the last of these three counts-the claim that
the minimum-coverage provision exceeded the Commerce Clause-the
court used language that suggests that it took more than just a "peek" at
the law, particularly when juxtaposed with the language in its subse-
quent opinion. As in the other PPACA cases, the parties quarreled over
whether the provision "seeks to impermissibly regulate economic inac-
tivity" or "merely tells [individuals] how they must pay for a service they
will almost certainly consume in the future."" The court declared that
"[a]t this stage in the litigation, [dismissal] is not even a close call." 90
Even the Supreme Court's broadest Commerce Clause jurisprudence
was "very different" from the case at bar and could not support the fed-
eral government's theory.9' According to the court, the plaintiffs in all
the Supreme Court's precedents that upheld government action under
the Commerce Clause "were each involved in an activity (regardless of
85. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
86. Id. at 1154-55. See generally Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1981).
87. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1160; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Nevertheless, the
court, citing recent commentary, thought that "the argument is not only plausible, but appears to
have actual merit . . . ." (emphasis added).
88. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62. The court, however, was not entirely
unsympathetic to this claim: "We all treasure the freedom to make our own life decisions,
including what to buy with respect to medical services. Is that a 'fundamental right'? The
Supreme Court has not indicated that it is-at least not yet." Id. at 1162.
89. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added in second parenthetical).
90. Id. at 1163.
91. Id. at 1164; see also id. 1163-64 (describing the defendants' arguments as "simply
without prior precedent" and pertinent case law as "differ[ing] markedly" in "several obvious
ways").
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whether it could readily be deemed interstate commerce) and each had a
choice to discontinue that activity."9 2 But those subject to the penalty
under the minimum-coverage provision make "no choice" in deciding
not to obtain health insurance; they are penalized "solely on citizenship
and on being alive."9 3
The court further refused to dismiss the "coercing and comman-
deering" claim of the States as directed toward the PPACA's Medicaid
expansion, though expressing substantial skepticism of its likelihood of
success. The cash-strapped States complained that they faced a "Hob-
son's Choice": either comply with the unprecedented overhaul of the
Medicaid system's regulatory and financial requirements or opt out of
the system and confront the devastating consequences of losing federal
matching funds. 94 Although Medicaid is formally a voluntary fed-
eral-state scheme and thus seemingly clearly within the Spending
Clause, the States sought refuge in the Supreme Court's speculation in
South Dakota v. Dole95 that "in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' "96 The court doubted
that this "coercion theory" amounted to much, pointing to the pervasive
hostility with which various appellate courts have treated it.9 7 Because,
however, the Eleventh Circuit had not spoken explicitly on this facet of
Dole, and because the Supreme Court must have "meant what it said"
there, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim, threadbare though it
may be, warranted factual development at later proceedings.98
B. The Summary Judgment Opinion
In its highly anticipated opinion on the merits, the Bondi court
responded to a lingering jurisdictional question that the parties debated
in their memoranda submissions to the court on motion to dismiss:
whether the States themselves had standing to challenge, as beyond the
Commerce Clause, the minimum-coverage provision binding on individ-
uals.99 Although the court did not have to resolve this question-having
found that the citizen and association plaintiffs had standing-the court
92. Id. at 1164.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1156-57.
95. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
96. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
97. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1158; see, e.g., Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 599 (8th
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) ("[W]e have found no coercion where a ... large amount of federal
money was at stake. Other circuits are in accord with this view.").
98. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
99. Compare Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at
8-10, McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV-EMT), 2010 WL 3163990 at
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answered affirmatively. Among the grounds that the States raised for
standing, the court noted that some of the State plaintiffs had passed
declaratory laws that seek "to protect their citizens from forced compli-
ance with the individual mandate."'I The court looked to the only other
case to confront state standing in this respect, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli
v. Sebelius,01 and agreed with the court's analysis there that despite the
declaratory nature of Virginia's "anti-mandate" statute, "the Common-
wealth had adequate standing to bring the suit insofar as '[t]he mere
existence of the lawfully-enacted statue [sic] is sufficient to trigger the
duty of the Attorney General of Virginia to defend the law and the asso-
ciated sovereign power to enact it.'"102 By comparison, at least two
States in Bondi had "standing to prosecute this case based on statutes
duly passed by their legislatures, and signed into law by their
Governors."103
After thus expanding its standing analysis to cover two citizens, a
trade association, and at least two States, the court finally turned to "the
crux of this entire case": whether the Commerce Clause could uphold
the minimum-coverage provision.1" The court engaged in a lengthy
exposition on this source of congressional power before repeating from
its dismissal opinion that "'activity' is an indispensable part [sic] the
Commerce Clause analysis" and therefore the constitutionality of the
minimum-coverage provision turned on whether the "failure to buy
health insurance is 'activity."' In the court's view, such failure was
not activity, contrary to two central arguments by the federal govern-
ment: (1) that "people without health insurance are actively engaged in
interstate commerce based on the purported 'unique' features of the
much broader health care market"; and (2) that "the uninsured have
made the calculated decision to engage in market timing and try to
finance their future medical needs out-of-pocket rather than through
insurance, and that this 'economic decision' is tantamount to activ-
ity."106 The court expressed a persistent concern throughout this discus-
*13-17, with Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 29-3 1, McCollum,
716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV-EMT), 2010 WL 2663348 at *28-30.
100. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT,
2011 WL 285683, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). See generally Richard Cauchi, State Legislation
and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2010, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18906 (last updated Jan. 5, 2011).
101. 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010).
102. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *9 (first alteration in original) (quoting Cuccinelli, 702 F.
Supp. 2d at 605-07).
103. Id. (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at *IO.
105. Id. at *23.
106. Id. at *27.
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sion about the inability to construct a limiting principle to the
defendants' theory of the Commerce Clause. Finishing its analysis, the
court held that Congress could not employ the Necessary and Proper
Clause to justify the minimum-coverage provision. Otherwise, Con-
gress's authority to resort to "necessary and proper" means to actualize
the enumerated ends in Article I would exceed the very scope of those
ends. 0 7 The court thus granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs'
favor.
The court spent comparably little length dispensing with the States'
Medicaid "coercing and commandeering" claim. In the first place,
resolving competing factual arguments over whether the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act's Medicaid overhaul would bankrupt the
States or save them money was "simply impossible" for the court.10
The court agreed with case law that legally, moreover, state participation
in Medicaid is voluntary, and the "coercion theory" from South Dakota
v. Dole is an unworkable judicial standard to measure Congress's spend-
ing power.'09 The court accordingly granted summary judgment for the
defendants." 0
Practically speaking, however, the federal government did not
"win" on this count. Going further than the Cuccinelli court in invalidat-
ing the minimum-coverage provision, the Bondi court ruled that none of
the hundreds of provisions in the PPACA could stand, as the unconstitu-
tional minimum-coverage provision was not severable from the larger
Act."' Assuring that its declaratory judgment regarding the constitution-
ality of the provision was "the functional equivalent of an injunction,"
the court declined to grant the plaintiffs' request for enjoining the Act.1 12
"This has been a difficult decision to reach," Judge Vinson said in clos-
ing, "and I am aware that it will have indeterminable implications."" 3
Whatever the implications, their future resolution now awaits the Elev-
enth Circuit.
107. Id. at *29-33.
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id. at *4-5.
110. Id. at *7.
111. Compare id. at *33-39 (holding that the minimum-coverage provision was not severable),
with Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 789-90 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding
that the minimum-coverage provision was severable).
112. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *39.
113. Id. at *40.
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IV. PLAINTIFF STANDING IN FLORIDA EX REL. BONDI AND THE
CHALLENGES TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Given the pace with which the judiciary has rendered highly publi-
cized, merit-based decisions on the constitutionality of the minimum-
coverage provision, the potentially dispositive procedural issues at stake
have been, unsurprisingly, overshadowed. Among these issues-namely
standing, ripeness, and the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act-
standing is "perhaps the most important .. ."114 The Ninth Circuit aptly
characterized ripeness as "standing on a timeline" because it temporally
evaluates the injury-in-fact element of standing."' And, as the Bondi
court explained, the Anti-Injunction Act, at least as applied to the mini-
mum-coverage provision, is not strictly procedural.116
One of the requisites of a constitutional "case" or "controversy" in
federal court, standing is generally understood as a party-focused doc-
trine that is "employed to refuse to determine the merits of a legal claim,
on the ground that even though the claim may be correct the litigant
advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial determi-
nation.""' A party cannot waive standing, nor can a court simply con-
cede that standing exists."' Only one party, however, needs standing to
pursue a claim.' 19 On appeal, a reviewing court has an independent obli-
gation, 120 using a de novo standard of review, 12 1 to ensure that a party
has standing as of the time that the complaint was filed. But an appellate
court must defer, under a clear-error standard of review, to a lower
114. Bischoff v. Osceola Cnty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 877-88 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (describing standing as "perhaps the most important"
jurisdictional doctrine under Article III).
115. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); see
also Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 710693, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 2,
2011) ("[T]he Court is of the opinion that the standing and ripeness issues concern, in pertinent
part, the same issue: whether Plaintiffs' alleged injuries are sufficiently certain. Therefore, the
Court's ripeness analysis would be substantially redundant of its standing analysis. As the
standing issue is dispositive at this juncture, the Court left Defendants' ripeness argument
unaddressed."); supra note 80 (discussing the overlap between standing and ripeness).
116. See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d
1120, 1131 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
117. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531 (3d ed. 1998).
118. See, e.g., Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598,
606-07 & n.24 (11th Cir. 1985); cf Brief for Appellees, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No.
10-2388 (6th Cir. filed Jan. 14, 2011) (failing to contest plaintiff standing to challenge the
minimum-coverage provision after disputing plaintiff standing at the district-court level).
119. See, e.g., Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1003 n.10 (11th Cir.
2004).
120. See, e.g., Arnold v. Martin, 449 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2006).
121. See, e.g., McKusick v. City of Melbourne, Fla., 96 F.3d 478, 482 (11th Cir. 1996).
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court's factual findings bearing on the elements of standing. 12 2 These
principles establish that when Bondi arrives at the Eleventh Circuit, the
court must reassess whether any of the plaintiffs-the citizens, trade
association, 123 or States-has standing to challenge the minimum-cover-
age provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
A. Citizen Standing to Challenge the Minimum-Coverage Provision:
Discerning the Injury-in-Fact
Every PPACA case to date has addressed standing. The courts that
reached the merits of the constitutional challenges to the minimum-cov-
erage provision necessarily resolved initially that at least one of the
plaintiffs, usually a citizen or organizational entity, had standing to con-
test the provision. Contrastingly, other courts dismissed whole PPACA
suits on standing grounds. 124 Both the cases that recognized standing
and those that did not are generally divisible with respect to the suffi-
cient injury-in-fact that they found (or failed to find): a present injury or
a future injury arising from the minimum-coverage provision. The pre-
dominant approach appears to be that a present injury will suffice for
standing in this context; because Bondi seemingly based its decision on
a determination of future injury, it is not entirely in accord-and indeed
at points is in conflict-with the present-injury framework.
1. THE SEARCH FOR PRESENT INJURY
Two of the three cases as of this writing that sustained the mini-
mum-coverage provision exemplify the course that several courts took
in scrutinizing an alleged present injury. In both cases, Thomas More
122. See, e.g., Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 975-77 (11th Cir. 2005).
123. The standing of the trade association turns on the citizen-association member having
standing. Accordingly, analysis of the citizens' standing subsumes analysis of the association's
standing. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) ("Because the individual plaintiffs have
demonstrated standing, including NFIB member Mary Brown, that means . . . that NFIB has
associational standing."); N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10-1489 (SDW)(MCA), 2010 WL
5060597, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010) (footnote omitted) ("Here, [an association of physicians] ...
has standing only if its individual members do. Dr. Criscito is the only [association] member
mentioned in the complaint. However, . . . Dr. Criscito does not have standing to challenge the
Act. Consequently, [the association] cannot proceed."), appealfiled, No. 11-4600 (3d Cir. Jan. 26,
2011).
124. See Kinder v. Geithner, No. 1:10 CV 101 RWS, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26,
2011); Purpura v. Sebellius, No. 3:10-cv-04814-FLW-DEA, 2011 WL1547768 (D.N.J. Apr. 21,
2011); Peterson v. United States, No. 10-cv-170-JL, 2011 WL 1207222 (D.N.H. Mar. 30, 2011);
Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 710693 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 2, 2011); N.J.
Physicians, 2010 WL 5060597; Shreeve v. Obama, No. 1:10-CV-71, 2010 WL 4628177 (E.D.
Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033 DMS(WMC), 2010 WL 3418436 (S.D.
Cal.), cert. denied before judgment, 131 S. Ct. 573 (2010).
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Law Center v. Obama'2 5 and Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner,126 the
plaintiffs were a coalition of organizational entities (a public-interest law
firm and a university, respectively) and various individual citizens,
including citizens without health insurance. The citizen plaintiffs in both
cases alleged essentially the same injury: In Thomas More, the plaintiffs
"describe[ed] their injury as being subjected to an unconstitutional regu-
lation causing present economic injury and forcing a change in behavior
with a significant possibility of future harm." 2 Similarly, in Liberty
University, the citizen plaintiffs argued that "before the individual cover-
age requirement takes effect in 2014, they will have to make 'significant
and costly changes' in their personal financial planning, necessitating
'significant lifestyle . . . changes' and extensive reorganization of their
personal and financial affairs."128 The courts concluded that the citizens'
present injury in having to "reorganize their affairs" under considerable
financial strain was enough for standing.129 As the Thomas More court
reasoned,
the government is requiring plaintiffs to undertake an expenditure, for
which the government must anticipate that significant financial plan-
ning will be required. That financial planning must take place well in
advance of the actual purchase of insurance in 2014. . . . There is
nothing improbable about the contention that the Individual Mandate
is causing plaintiffs to feel economic pressure today.13 0
Notwithstanding their outcomes, a number of cases that dismissed
attacks on the minimum-coverage provision for lack of standing are con-
sistent with Thomas More and Liberty University. In New Jersey Physi-
cians, Inc. v. Obama,13 1 for example, a citizen plaintiff who sought to
challenge the provision alleged that he had standing because he was
presently uninsured and did not plan to attain insurance in the future. In
holding that the plaintiff did not have standing, the court noted that,
unlike the citizen plaintiffs in Thomas More, he had not alleged that he
was "being compelled to reorganize [his] affairs and that the need to
purchase insurance was causing [him] to feel economic pressure
125. 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
126. No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010).
127. Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
128. Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *5 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). The
uninsured citizen plaintiffs made this claim. Other citizen plaintiffs included a state legislator, city
councilman, and medical doctor, all of whom the court found lacked standing. Id. at *4 nn.6-7.
129. Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted); Liberty Univ.,
2010 WL 4860299, at *5-7; see also Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 223010, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011).
130. Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
131. No. 10-1489 (SDW)(MCA), 2010 WL 5060597 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010).
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today."l 3 2 Likewise, the court in Bryant v. Holder stressed that
"[i]mportantly, Plaintiffs do not allege that they are presently rearrang-
ing their finances or incurring any economic harm."' 3
The courts in several cases, moreover, offered comparable
responses to two of the federal government's frequent contentions about
plaintiff standing: "that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries are too remote
temporally to confer standing" and "that the future injuries are too
uncertain or speculative to confer standing.""' As to the first argument,
the Thomas More court, for example, conceded that "[ilt is true that the
minimum coverage provision does not become effective until 2014" and
that it "thus neither imposes obligations on plaintiffs nor exacts revenue
from them before that time."13 5 "Ultimately, [however,] the court did not
address whether the plaintiffs' alleged future injury was sufficient to
confer standing, as it held that the plaintiffs had alleged a present
injury."1 3
Some courts expressed receptiveness to the federal government's
second, interrelated argument about the uncertainty of future injury.
Among the courts that dismissed challenges to the minimum-coverage
provision on standing grounds, the court in Baldwin v. Sebelius,'" for
instance, observed that "even if [the citizen plaintiff] does not have
insurance at this time, he may well satisfy the minimum coverage provi-
sion of the Act by 2014: he may take a job that offers health insurance,
or qualify for Medicaid or Medicare, or he may choose to purchase
health insurance before the effective date of the Act."" Acknowledging
132. Id. at *7 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shreeve v. Obama,
No. 1:10-CV-71, 2010 WL 4628177, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010) (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted) ("Plaintiffs do not allege they will be compelled by the federal
government to purchase health care coverage; nor have the individual Plaintiffs claimed they have
rearranged their personal affairs presently or changed their behaviors to account for a future
economic harm.").
133. Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 710693, at *8 n.3 (S.D. Miss. Feb.
2, 2011).
134. Id. at *4.
135. Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
136. Bryant, 2011 WL 710693, at *5 (emphases added) (citing Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d
at 889).
137. No. 10CV1033 DMS(WMC), 2010 WL 3418436 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010).
138. Id. at *3; N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10-1489 (SDW)(MCA), 2010 WL 5060597,
at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010); Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 888; cf Goudy-Bachman v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 223010, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at *6--7
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010). But see Bryant, 2011 WL 710693, at *10 (adopting the Florida district
court's rationale in rejecting the argument that "within the next four years, Plaintiffs may find
employment in which they receive health insurance as a benefit, qualify for Medicare or
Medicaid, decide to purchase a health insurance policy, or qualify for one of the provision's
exemptions").
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these contingencies, the courts in Thomas More and Liberty University
limited their holdings so that "[i]f something happens to change plain-
tiffs' circumstances in the future, such as coverage by employer-pro-
vided insurance, the case may very well become moot."' 39
Another common thread in the case law is the allegation by plain-
tiffs that they "object 'to being compelled by the federal government to
purchase health care coverage."'"o Where the plaintiffs additionally
alleged a present economic injury, the courts did not address this "com-
pulsion" argument. But in Baldwin, where the court did not find such an
injury, the court did address-and rejected-the plaintiffs' argument
that they "do not consent to being compelled to comply"l 4 ' with the
minimum-coverage provision. The court replied that the plaintiffs "can-
not manufacture standing by withholding their consent to the law." 42
"To the extent Plaintiffs seek relief because Congress's and the Presi-
dent's failure to pass constitutionally sound health care legislation
undermines the rule of law," the court stated, "Plaintiffs are simply air-
ing generalized grievances that the Court is precluded from
adjudicating." 43
2. THE SEARCH FOR FUTURE INJURY
In its dismissal opinion, the Bondi court did not clearly delineate
whether the citizen plaintiffs' disputed injury was a present or future
one, as so many of the other courts did. But the court's framing of the
governing standard-whether the plaintiffs established "a realistic dan-
ger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or
enforcement that is reasonably pegged to a sufficiently fixed period of
time and which is not merely hypothetical or conjectural"l 4 4-and its
accompanying analysis suggest that its focus was largely on future
injury arising from the imposition and enforcement of the minimum-
coverage provision in 2014.
By contrast, the court in Mead v. Holderl4 5 explicitly concluded
that the citizen plaintiffs there adequately alleged a "future injury fairly
139. Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 889; Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *7.
140. Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
141. Baldwin, 2010 WL 3418436, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citations omitted) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Liberty
Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *4 n.7 (concluding that a physician plaintiffs opposition to the
PPACA on the ground that "he believes it will not provide quality care to more patients at lower
cost . .. appears to raise mere policy disagreements with the Act" and that "[t]his litigation is not
the proper forum to air those grievances").
144. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1147 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
1262 [Vol. 65:1241
2011] PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
traceable to the enforcement of the ACA beginning in 2014, when they
are forced to make annual shared responsibility payments ... ."146 Like
the Bondi court, the Mead court noted that the penalty under the mini-
mum-coverage provision was definitely fixed in 2014 and was a final
governmental decision, and would be imposed and enforced by the fed-
eral government in 2014 unless the court intervened. 14 7 The court recog-
nized that it could not be said "with absolute certainty" that the citizen
plaintiffs would be subject to the requirements of the minimum-cover-
age provision in 2014. "All that [wa]s required," however, was that the
plaintiffs allege a "substantial probability" that they would be subject to
such requirements.' 48 Having found that the plaintiffs met this standard,
the court "conclude[d] that they ... demonstrated a concrete, particular-
ized, and imminent future injury": payment of a penalty for failure to
comply with the minimum-coverage provision.149
The challenge with the Bondi and Mead courts' approach is that
"[a]llegations of future injury will satisfy the requirement 'only if [the
plaintiff] is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the
result of the challenged official conduct."""0 This is a considerably
more stringent inquiry than searching for a present injury. Unsurpris-
ingly, then, the present-injury approach has predominated. Indeed, con-
sidering that no one will be at direct risk of incurring the penalty under
the minimum-coverage provision until 2014 at the earliest, the federal
government appears to be correct that "the plaintiffs' alleged injuries are
'too remote temporally' to confer standing."'"' The Thomas More court
said as much in stating that "[i]t is true that the minimum coverage pro-
vision does not become effective until 2014 . . . [and] thus neither
imposes obligations on plaintiffs nor exacts revenue from them before
that time." 52
But, as a general principle, "temporal remoteness is [only] one fac-
tor to consider in the broader inquiry of whether a plaintiffs alleged
injuries are sufficiently certain and/or imminent.""'3 In the context of the
minimum-coverage provision, another factor is the certainty that, come
2014, the citizen plaintiffs will be uninsured and therefore susceptible to
146. Id. at *8.
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id. at *8.
149. Id.
150. Baldwin v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 3418436, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306
F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2002)).
151. Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 710693, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 2,
2011) (footnote omitted).
152. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
153. Bryant, 2011 WL 710693, at *10 (footnote omitted).
1263
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
injury in the form of the provision's penalty. Bondi-creating a conflict
with Baldwin, among other cases-expressly rejected the federal gov-
ernment's assertion that there is "too much 'uncertainty' ""4 here to pre-
clude a finding of sufficient injury-in-fact. According to the court, just
as the citizen plaintiffs might become eligible for Medicare before 2014,
for example, they might also "no longer be alive [by 2014], or may at
that time fall within one of the 'exempt' categories. Such 'vagaries' of
life are always present, in almost every case that involves a pre-enforce-
ment challenge.""'
For support that the federal government's logic would bar all pre-
enforcement judicial review of a statute, the court relied singularly on
the Supreme Court case Pierce v. Society of Sisters.'5 6 Two private
schools there sought and obtained constitutional review of a compulsory
public-education law, which would not take effect for two years.
"[N]otwithstanding the universe of possibilities that could have occurred
between the filing of the suit and the law going into effect years later,"
Bondi pointed out, the Supreme Court ruled that it could entertain the
challenge because the private schools' injury "was present and very real,
not a mere possibility in the remote future"; furthermore, preventing
such "impending injury by unlawful action is a well-recognized function
of courts of equity."'15 Bondi, however, did not consider that the law in
Pierce imposed criminal penalties for failure to comply-a factor that
strongly favors pre-enforcement challenge of a statute.'15 The minimum-
coverage provision, however, prohibits criminal penalties and other
sanctions for failure to procure health insurance, thus weakening the
court's reliance on Pierce.15 9
Furthermore, Mead's analysis does not lend much support to Bondi.
Although the Mead court, citing Bondi, agreed that the "vagaries of life"
should not preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of a statute,160 its
analysis is punctuated with discussion that the Bondi court probably
would deem hypothetical and superfluous. Consistent with the federal
government's frequent contention that by 2014 a citizen "may take a job
that offers health insurance, or qualify for Medicaid or Medicare, or. . .
154. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1147 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
155. Id.
156. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
157. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pierce,
268 U.S. at 536).
158. See N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10-1489 (SDW)(MCA), 2010 WL 5060597, at *5
(D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010) (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010)).
159. Id. (citation omitted).
160. Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 WL 611139, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
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may choose to purchase health insurance,"16 1 the Mead court held that
one citizen plaintiff, a sixty-two-year-old uninsured, lacked standing
because there was no "substantial probability" that in 2014 she would
not be covered by Medicare Part A, which would exempt her from the
penalty under the minimum-coverage provision.162 More fundamentally,
the court's reason in the first place for engaging in inquiry over future
injury is questionable; in contrast to the Bondi court, the Mead court
additionally, explicitly held that the plaintiffs alleged "a present injury
resulting from their needing to rearrange their finances now in anticipa-
tion of .. . mandatory payments" under the minimum-coverage provi-
sion.16 3 This present injury alone would have been enough for the court
to continue to the merits.
In this last regard, Bondi is distinct from all the other PPACA
cases, including Mead, in their varying emphasis on the finding (or fail-
ure to find) a present economic burden. Responding to the federal gov-
ernment's argument that the plaintiffs could not accurately predict that
health insurance would be an economic burden because the PPACA's
cost reforms could spur them to buy insurance on their own, the Bondi
court downplayed that an economic burden was integral to the citizen
plaintiffs' standing.164 Indeed, it did "not appear to be the case" that the
plaintiffs objected to the minimum-coverage provision "solely" on the
grounds that it imposed an economic burden and that they did not have
health insurance because they could not afford it.'65 Rather, the plaintiffs
did "not want to be forced to spend their money (whether they have a
little or a lot) on something they do not want (or feel that they need),
and, in this respect, they object to the individual mandate as 'unconstitu-
tional overreaching.' "166
The court's sanctioning of this complaint of "constitutional over-
reaching" is troublesome because the determination "for philosophical
reasons not to buy insurance" is akin to "the kind of 'Psychic Injury'
that ordinarily would not confer standing." 67 Or, in the words of Bald-
161. Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033 DMS(WMC), 2010 WL 3418436, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 27, 2010).
162. Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *6. The court explained that the federal government renders
Medicare Part A coverage in tandem with Social Security benefits. Because the plaintiff alleged
only that she would refuse to enroll in Medicare Part A, and not that she would forego her Social
Security benefits, the court was unconvinced that there was a "substantial probability" that the
plaintiff would reject her monthly Social Security checks and thus not be covered by Medicare
Part A in 2014. Id.
163. Id. at *8.
164. See, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 716 F. Supp. 2d
1120, 1146 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at
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win, this is little more than a "generalized grievance."'16 As the Supreme
Court and Eleventh Circuit have reiterated, however, "'a plaintiff raising
only a generally available grievance about government-claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Con-
stitution and laws . . . -does not state an Article III case or
controversy.' "169
The implications of a party having standing to allege a "generalized
grievance" are vast. If "constitutional overreaching" meets the injury
prong of standing, then conceivably any opponent of the PPACA could
challenge it in federal court. This is an important consideration, given
that the Supreme Court's first review of the minimum coverage provi-
sion might be limited to its constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause, leaving open (assuming that it passes muster) future opportuni-
ties to challenge it on alternative bases (for example, the First Amend-
ment). Moreover, the limitations that the Thomas More and Liberty
University courts placed on the injuries in those cases-that future cir-
cumstances could moot the plaintiffs' challenge to the minimum-cover-
age provision 70-do not attach to injurious "constitutional
overreaching." Only a change of mind-over which an individual wields
total control-can moot one's grievance in this manner.
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit should reject Bondi's rationale for citi-
zen standing to the extent that it deviates from analyzing a present
injury."'7 By critically reviewing the lower court's reasoning and search-
ing for such an injury, the Eleventh Circuit would hold true to traditional
standing principles, as other PPACA courts adhered to them. If, on the
other hand, the court approved Bondi's future-injury analysis, it would
shield the plaintiffs' alleged injury from becoming moot before 2014
and would invite premature challenges to controversial legislation that
has a staggered future timetable but that does not bear directly on an
individual before implementation-thus potentially undermining the
democratic process. Skeptical appellate review is further necessary to
4-5, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla.
Jan. 31, 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 4949245 at *9- 10 (citation omitted).
168. Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033 DMS(WMC), 2010 WL 3418436, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 27, 2010).
169. Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm'n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1331 (1 Ith Cir. 2007) (quoting Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 601 (2007)).
170. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at *7
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 889 (E.D.
Mich. 2010).
171. To be sure, fragments of the district court's dismissal opinion suggest allegations of a
present economic injury. See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1146, 1149-50 n.11 The court's
summary-judgment opinion, moreover, may have mitigated the shortcomings of its future-injury
analysis by determining that the citizen plaintiffs "are needing to take investigatory steps and
make financial arrangements now to ensure compliance" in 2014. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *8.
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expose the States' amendment of their complaint to include two random
citizens as plaintiffs for what it really was: a strategic litigation move to
"plug the standing gap"172 created by the State plaintiffs-the true
adversaries, whose standing to challenge the minimum-coverage provi-
sion is "far less obvious .... "
B. State Standing to Challenge the Minimum-Coverage Provision:
The Sovereignty of the Whole Versus the Sovereignty of
the Parts
States have a unique role in the Article III standing analysis. To
have standing in federal court, a state must assert an injury on one of
several grounds. A state may claim an injury to a sovereign interest,
such as its interest in "creat[ing] and enforce[ing] a legal code, both civil
and criminal" to exercise sovereignty over individuals and entities
within the state's jurisdiction. 17" Additionally, a state may claim an
injury to a propriety interest in land or a business venture, for
examples.1
A state does not have standing to vindicate private individuals'
rights.17 6 Yet a state may have standing to bring suit as parens patriae
(meaning "parent of the country") to protect its "quasi-sovereign" inter-
ests "in the health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its
residents ... [and] in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status
within the federal system."17 7 An important limitation on parens patriae
standing, as the Supreme Court articulated in Massachusetts v. Mellon
(Mellon),7 1 is that "a state, as parens patriae, may [not] institute judicial
proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of
the statutes thereof." 7 9 The rationale for this limitation is grounded in
federalism: "[I]t is no part of [a state's] duty or power to enforce [citi-
zens'] rights in respect of their relations with the federal government. In
172. See Simon Lazarus & Alan Morrison, Lawsuit Abuse, GOP Style, SLATE (May 5, 2010,
9:35 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2252867/ ("[S]tate governments are the wrong plaintiffs to
challenge the individual insurance mandate. . . . The attorneys general might have attempted to
plug this gap by adding individual plaintiffs to their complaints.").
173. Ilya Somin, Standing and Ripeness Issues in the Lawsuits Against Obamacare, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 2, 2010, 2:15 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/02/standing-and-ripeness-
issues-in-the-lawsuits-against-obamacare/; see also Farley, supra note 3, at 70-71.
174. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982); cf 15
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.60(4)(a) (3d ed. 1997) (footnote
omitted) ("What constitutes a state's sovereign interests, however, is somewhat unclear.").
175. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 601-02.
176. Id. at 602.
177. Id. at 607.
178. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
179. Id. at 485; cf Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 1989) ("It is
unclear how broadly this pronouncement is to be taken . . . .").
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that field it is the United States, and not the state, which represents them
as parens patriae . . . ."
1. VIRGINIA EX REL. CUCCINELLI: DUBIOUS SUPPORT FOR
STATE STANDING
Faced with resolving whether the States in Bondi have standing to
challenge the minimum-coverage provision, the Eleventh Circuit, much
like the district court in its summary-judgment opinion, naturally might
look to Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,st the only other case to
deal with the issue. The federal government there relied on Mellon to
argue on motion to dismiss that Virginia could not contest the constitu-
tionality of the provision on behalf of its citizens as parens patriae.182
Moreover, the federal government claimed, a Virginia statute that
declared, without any enforcement mechanism, that "[n]o resident of
this Commonwealth . .. shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy
of individual insurance coverage""' was an insufficient basis on which
the Commonwealth could assert an injury to a sovereign interest. 184 The
court, however, rejected the Mellon analogy and embraced Virginia's
argument that it was suing in its individual, or sovereign, interest insofar
as it was "not simply representing individual citizens, [but wa]s defend-
ing the constitutionality of its duly enacted laws."1 85 Adopting the ratio-
nale of a Tenth Circuit case, Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States,"'
the court held that the peremptory effect of the federal minimum-cover-
age provision on the Virginia statute created a sufficient injury-in-fact to
grant the Commonwealth, through its Attorney General, Article III
standing.'8 7 Accordingly, Virginia could move forward with its substan-
tive challenges.
180. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86.
181. 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010).
182. Id. at 602.
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010). See generally Farley, supra note 3, at 53-58
(discussing legislative efforts in Virginia to reject the minimum-coverage provision in the
PPACA).
184. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
185. Id. at 602-03. Oklahoma apparently hopes that this same argument will grant the State
standing to sue in federal court there to challenge the minimum-coverage provision. With a new
attorney general in office, the State announced that it would file an independent lawsuit to defend
the "Oklahoma Health Care Freedom Amendment, which amended the state Constitution to say
that Oklahomans cannot be forced to purchase insurance . . . ." Press Release, Okla. Office of the
Att'y Gen., Oklahoma Attorney General-Elect Will File Lawsuit Against Federal Health Care
Reform Bill (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.oag.state.ok.us/oagweb.nsf/0/8723EAl0351AAEE086257
81400654082!OpenDocument; see Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex
rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. 6:11-CV-30 (E.D. Okla. filed Jan. 21, 2011).
186. 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
187. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07.
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This analysis does not translate automatically to Bondi. Florida-
the namesake of the lawsuit-notably does not have an "anti-mandate"
law comparable to Virginia's. In fact, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
that a proposed 2010 state constitutional amendment, which aimed to
"guard against mandates that don't work," was "misleading and ambigu-
ous" in its ballot language and therefore could not appear on the bal-
lot.' Of course, this is not the end of the matter because other State
plaintiffs in Bondi, such as Idaho and Utah, have laws like Virginia's,
and only one of them needs standing to advance a challenge to the
PPACA's minimum-coverage provision."'
Nonetheless, close scrutiny suggests that the Cuccinelli opinion is
not cogent. Carrying broad consequences, the opinion implies that a law
simply of a "declaratory nature,"o'9 which "imposes no obligation"l 91 on
a state, may be sufficient for standing where a federal law "preempts"
the state law. To use the words of the Cuccinelli court in its subsequent
Commerce Clause discussion, this defies "logical limitation."19 2 Profes-
sor Joondeph's criticism on this point warrants excerpting:
[I]f this proposition is true, then any state, in any circumstance, could
enact a law stating something akin to "federal Public Law [fill in the
blank] is inoperable in this state," and thus have standing to sue the
United States government in federal court to have the federal law
declared unconstitutional. Indeed, the logic of Judge Hudson's opin-
ion would extend to administrative regulations as well, as those, too,
are part of a state's "legal code." So presumably a state-level agency
could promulgate a regulation stating that, say, it is inconsistent with
state law for any government to regulate greenhouse gases, and the
188. Fla. Dep't of State v. Mangat, 43 So. 3d 642, 651 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam).
189. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
190. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 605. The declaration-enforcement distinction sets
Cuccinelli apart from the case whose reasoning it adopted, Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United
States. The latter case involved a federal criminal law that prohibited a person convicted under
state law of a misdemeanor of domestic violence from owning a firearm that had traveled in
interstate commerce. Crank, 539 F.3d at 1239. The statute was inapplicable, however, to any
misdemeanor conviction that had been expunged or set aside. Id. (citation omitted) (footnote
omitted). The Wyoming Legislature enacted a law establishing a procedure to expunge
misdemeanors of domestic violence. When the State clashed with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives over what source of law-federal or state- governed the
definition of "expunge" in the federal statute, the State had a cognizable interest for the purpose of
standing in whether enforcing the procedure under its law would preclude imposition of the
federal statute. By contrast, as the federal government argued on motion to dismiss in Bondi, the
State plaintiffs' "anti-mandate" statutes "have no function beyond expressing an opinion that
federal law is invalid." Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 15 n.10, Florida ex
rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010)
(No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV-EMT), 2010 WL 3500155 at *14.
191. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
192. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010).
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existence of that regulation alone would give the state standing to
challenge the federal government's regulation of private firms in that
state. 193
Significantly, the Cuccinelli court attempted to immunize its stand-
ing decision by reasoning that the "purported transparent legislative
intent underlying [the] enactment [of the Virginia statute] is irrele-
vant."1 94 All that matters is that the statute "is a lawfully-enacted part of
the laws of Virginia."195 The goal of this and similar measures-to nul-
lify federal law-is problematic, however, in that it is "constitutionally
impossible"1 16 to achieve under the Supremacy Clause"' of the Consti-
tution. American history is replete with anecdotes-perhaps the Civil
War foremost among them-that establish this "impossibility." Thus, a
state law that aspires only to reject the operability of a federal enactment
within that state's territory "is not 'lawfully enacted' in a broader
sense."1 9 8 A contrary conclusion would be a backward step in the devel-
opment of federalism in the United States and would encourage provo-
cation between the federal and state governments, with potential adverse
consequences in times of high antigovernment sentiment. Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit should reject Cuccinelli as support for the States to
have standing to challenge the minimum-coverage provision in their
own right.
2. MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA: "SPECIAL SOLICITUDE" IN CHALLENGING
THE MINIMUM-COVERAGE PROVISION?
The alleged bases left for the States in Bondi to challenge the mini-
mum-coverage provision-unexplored in Bondi-are equally, if not
more, weak than the basis that the court in Cuccinelli recognized. On
motion to dismiss, the States in Bondi asserted two alternative bases. For
one, they argued, they had standing to attack the provision because Con-
gress had "usurp[ed] Plaintiff States' sovereign power to enact statutes
or State constitutional provisions to protect their State citizens from
193. Brad Joondeph, More on Virginia's Standing (Or the Lack Thereof), ACA LmG. BLOG
(Aug. 9, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2010/08/more-on-virginias-
standing-or-lack.html; see also Jack Balkin, Judge Preserves Constitutional Challenge to
Individual Mandate, BALKNIZATION (Aug. 2, 2010, 12:25 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/
08/judge-preserves-constitutional.html ("In essence, Judge Hudson argues that by passing a law
that says that Virginia will interpose itself to protect its citizens from the individual mandate,
Virginia has succeeded both in giving itself standing and in getting around the federal tax-anti-
injunction act. These arguments are the weakest part of the opinion . . .
194. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
195. Id.
196. Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Care Reform?, NEw ENG. J. MED., Feb. 10,
2010, http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=2967.
197. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
198. Joondeph, supra note 193; see also Jost, supra note 196.
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compulsion in their healthcare choices."' 9 9 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, foreclosed the justiciability of this assertion almost a century ago
in Mellon. There, it stated that it was without jurisdiction in cases where
it was "called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property, not
rights of dominion over physical domain, not quasi sovereign rights
actually invaded or threatened, but abstract questions of political power,
of sovereignty, of government." 200
In addition, the States claimed that they could challenge the mini-
mum-coverage provision "because other portions of the Act-expanded
Medicaid coverage and insurance requirements . . . -clearly will injure
them, and the mandate cannot be severed from those provisions." 20 1 This
"bootstrap-through-a-lack-of-severability argument" 20 2 muddles the
basic tenets of Article III standing. Whether the PPACA's enlargement
of Medicaid, a technically voluntary program for the States, will ulti-
mately impose costs greater than the savings the States might realize is
sharply disputed2 0 3-in other words, a matter of conjecture that does not
rise to actual injury.20 Moreover, the States seemed to conflate the
injury and redressability prongs of Article IHl standing. Although strik-
ing down the minimum-coverage provision might redress the suppos-
edly injurious Medicaid provisions of the PPACA (assuming that the
court must invalidate the latter because the former is unconstitutional
and cannot be severed from the PPACA), the question over the injury
that the minimum-coverage provision imposes on the States persists on
its own.205
The States thus rest on shaky jurisdictional ground in attacking the
minimum-coverage provision. Not to be overlooked, however, the
Supreme Court's most recent proclamation on state standing in Massa-
chusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (Massachusetts)206 debata-
bly may create a wrinkle in this analysis. In that case, a coalition of
States, intervening on behalf of various private organizations, challenged
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) denial of a rulemaking
199. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 99,
at 8, 2010 WL 3163990 at *16 (citation omitted).
200. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85 (1923).
201. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 99,
at 6-7, 2010 WL 3163990 at *15.
202. Brad Joondeph, Standing Through Non-Severability?, ACA LrrlG. BLOG (Oct. 2, 2010,
1:44 PM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/standing-through-non-severability.html.
203. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3: 10-cv-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
204. See Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 190, at 13, 2010 WL
3500155 at *13-14.
205. See Joondeph, supra note 202.
206. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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petition that asked the Agency to regulate, pursuant to the Clean Air Act,
greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles.2 0 7 As a threshold mat-
ter, the Court had to decide whether the States had standing to seek
review of the Agency's order.208
The Court used sweeping language to frame the issue. "States are
not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction,"
the Court stated, "stress[ing]" the "special position and interest" of one
of the State plaintiffs before the Court, Massachusetts." Quoting a case
in which the Court held that Georgia had standing to protect its citizens
from air pollution originating in Tennessee, the Court declared that a
state suing as parens patriae "has an interest independent of and behind
the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has
the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their for-
ests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air."2 10 The Court concluded
that "Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign terri-
tory today" from the ravaging effects of global warming supported fed-
eral jurisdiction, "[j]ust as Georgia's independent interest 'in all the
earth and air within its domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century
ago . . .. Moreover, in the present case Congress had enumerated a
procedural right under the Clean Air Act to challenge the EPA's rejec-
tion of a rulemaking petition. "Given that procedural right and Massa-
chusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing
analysis."212
The Court still had to determine whether Massachusetts actually
had standing. Applying the three-part Article III test, the Court con-
cluded first that rising sea levels associated with global warming had
injured, and would continue to injure, the Commonwealth. 213 The EPA,
furthermore, had at least "contributed" to Massachusetts's injuries by
failing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles-
leading causal agents of global warming. 214 Lastly, EPA regulatory
action to some extent would redress the Commonwealth's injuries by
slowing or reducing (although perhaps not preventing) the risk of real,
though remote, catastrophic harm from global warming. 215 Therefore,
207. Id. at 510-14.
208. Id. at 516.
209. Id. at 518.
210. Id. at 518-19 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
211. Id. at 519.
212. Id. at 520.
213. Id. at 521-23.
214. Id. at 523-24.
215. Id. at 525-26.
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Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA's order.2 16
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the Court for
"chang[ing] the rules" of Article III standing.2 17 According to him, the
notion that states have "special solicitude" for standing purposes "has no
basis in our jurisprudence," and the majority was "conspicuously" short
of authority to support such a notion. 218 The Chief Justice further
accused the majority of "overlook[ing]" the rule from Mellon that a state
generally cannot assert a quasi-sovereign interest against the federal
government.2 19 Turning to the "traditional terms" of standing-injury-
in-fact, causation, and redressability-the Chief Justice concluded that
Massachusetts did not pass the test. 2 20 He lamented that the majority's
relaxation of "Article III requirements has caused us to transgress 'the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society.' "221
As to the state-initiated challenges to the PPACA's minimum-cov-
erage provision, sources suggest a potentially expansive role for Massa-
chusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. The PPACA courts
already have seized on Massachusetts's "special solicitude" language.2 22
By footnote in its dismissal opinion, the court in Cuccinelli observed
that states "are often accorded 'special solicitude' in standing analy-
sis." 2 23 And the court in New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. Obama made
this point specifically in relation to Bondi: "[I]n that case, there were
sixteen states involved and as stated earlier, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that states are usually given 'special solicitude' in the standing
analysis due to their need to protect their sovereign interests." 224 Corn-
mentators, moreover, are unsure about the influence that the case could
wield.22 5 Professor Somin, for example, suggested that Massachusetts
216. Id. at 526.
217. Id. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 539.
220. Id. at 540.
221. Id. at 548-49 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
222. Cf Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112
PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 19 (2007) (exploring the historical origin of the phrase "special solicitude"
and hypothesizing that it "is likely to become shorthand for the new rule for standing this case
creates (or at least clarifies)").
223. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(citation omitted).
224. N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10-1489 (SDW)(MCA), 2010 WL 5060597, at *6
(D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2010) (citation omitted); id. at *5 (distinguishing Massachusetts as authority for an
uninsured citizen to have standing to challenge the minimum-coverage provision).
225. See Farley, supra note 3, at 70-72; Linda Greenhouse, Who Stands for Standing?,
OPINIONATOR (Sept. 23, 2010, 9:44 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/who-
stands-for-standing/; Somin, supra note 173; Ilya Somin, Are Right and Left Changing Where
They Stand on Standing?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 18, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://volokh.com/
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"ironically" could confer the State litigants with standing to challenge
the provision-the irony being that "the EPA case was decided by the
five most liberal justices-the ones least likely to be sympathetic to the
Obamacare lawsuits, while the four most conservative justices dissented
... and have more generally supported stringent standing rules."22 6
Still, that the States have "special solicitude" to challenge the mini-
mum-coverage provision is hardly certain. Important bases exist to dif-
ferentiate Massachusetts in the PPACA setting. In response to Chief
Justice Roberts' allegations that the majority abandoned the Mellon rule,
the Court assured that it did not: "[T]here is a critical difference between
allowing a State 'to protect her citizens from the operation of federal
statutes' (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert
its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do)."22 7 The Court
continued that "Massachusetts does not here dispute that the Clean Air
Act applies to its citizens" 2 2 -exactly what the States dispute with
respect to the minimum-coverage provision. Further, the Court did not
speak of states' "special solicitude" in a vacuum; rather, it conveyed that
Massachusetts had special solicitude to challenge the EPA's denial of
the rulemaking petition to the extent that the Commonwealth had a "pro-
cedural right [to challenge the denial] and [a] stake in protecting its
quasi-sovereign interests . . . ."229 By contrast, the PPACA features no
analogous procedural right. Additionally, the States in both McCollum
and Cuccinelli expressly disavowed that they were suing as parens
patriae to protect their "quasi-sovereign" interests, 2 30 as Massachusetts
was. The Cuccinelli court thus misread Massachusetts when it said that
"[g]iven the stake states have in protecting their sovereign interests, they
are often accorded 'special solicitude' in standing analysis."2 3 1
2010/08/18/are-right-and-left-changing-where-they-stand-on-standing/; cf 13B WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, supra note 117, § 3531.11.1 ("Speculation about the balance among the Justices in
future decisions [after Massachusetts] may be engaging, but is futile. . . . It remains to be seen
how often even a narrow majority will be found to support state standing even in cases addressing
administrative regulatory acts, much less more fundamental constitutional questions.").
226. Somin, supra note 173; see also Greenhouse, supra note 225.
227. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 520.
230. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 603 ("The Commonwealth argues that it is not prosecuting
this case in a parens patriae, or quasi-sovereign capacity."); Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 99, at 10 n.12, 2010 WL 3163990 at
*17 n.12 (describing Mellon and Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency as
"inapposite" and "deal[ing] with States' quasi-sovereign standing as parens patriae").
231. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 606 n.5 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also N.J.
Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, No. 10-1489 (SDW)(MCA), 2010 WL 5060597, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 8,
2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) ("[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that states are
usually given 'special solicitude' in the standing analysis due to their need to protect their
sovereign interests.").
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The Supreme Court's rulings in Mellon-and even in Massachu-
setts v. Environmental Protection Agency-do not afford the States any
legal foundation to oppose the minimum-coverage provision. Therefore,
the Bondi court erred in its dictum analysis in its summary judgment
opinion that at least two State plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
provision. Nevertheless, Bondi and the other state-led actions present
reviewing courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, with an opportunity to
clarify how broadly Massachusetts extends.
V. CONCLUSION
That someone will have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of Congress's and the President's latest attempt at national health-care
reform is perhaps a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, the question of
who that someone will be-and should be-remains. This question is
important given the development of standing as "one of the hot legal
topics of the coming months or even years"23 2 and the intense politiciza-
tion of the legal challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act. The political dimensions are most apparent in the state-initiated
lawsuits, which have pitted governors against attorneys general, attor-
neys general against governors, and citizens against citizens in ascertain-
ing whether taxpayer-funded attacks on the legislation promote the
"public interest."23 3 The courts accordingly should probe carefully
whether states in their official capacities have standing to mount these
attacks in the first place.
A skeptical analysis suggests that, at most, the two citizen plaintiffs
in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
have standing to dispute the minimum-coverage provision in the Act.
Even so, Bondi's foundation for recognizing these plaintiffs' standing is
in tension with the sensible, limited standing jurisprudence that has
emerged from cases such as Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, which
concluded that a citizen's present economic injury in securing sufficient
health insurance under the Act or facing the threat of a "penalty" in 2014
was all that Article III required. The State plaintiffs, however, fare much
less successfully in the calculus, as the asserted injuries to "sovereign"
interests recognized by Cuccinelli and Bondi lack support in case law,
including Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.
232. Greenhouse, supra note 225.
233. See, e.g., Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan &
Pennsylvania in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Florida ex rel. Bondi
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (No. 3:10-
cv-00091-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 4876892 at *4 ("Unlike the Attorneys General of their respective
states who are plaintiffs in this action, the Governors believe that the Act is constitutional and
consistent with the principles of dual sovereignty underlying our federal form of government.").
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In the closing remarks of his dismissal opinion, Judge Vinson
touched on the concerns of federalism at the core of the PPACA cases.
Quoting the Supreme Court, he underscored that the Constitution
"divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in
one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day."2 34 This
concern is consistent with the normative overlays of this casenote. At
least with regard to the state-led lawsuits against the PPACA's mini-
mum-coverage provision-an "individual mandate" whose burden ulti-
mately falls on individuals, not states-a critical, dispositive standing
analysis appreciates that states ordinarily "should not go about meddling
in the enforcement of federal law as between individual citizens."235
Such meddling divides the citizenry and requires the states to take a
side, "even if the only result is to submit a question of federal law for
resolution by a federal court." 236 Therefore, the final constitutional test
over the minimum-coverage provision should rest with the citizens-the
"people." And with the multitude of PPACA lawsuits that have material-
ized across the United States, no shortage of authentic citizen-led oppor-
tunities exists. Bondi-a showcase of a group of States' "institutional
heft" 23 7-iS just not one of them.
234. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1165 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992)).
235. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 117, § 3531.11.1.
236. Id.
237. Joondeph, supra note 19.
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